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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This

Court

has

appellate

pursuant to the provisions of

jurisdiction

in

this

matter

Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(f)

(1990 as Amended).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There is one issue on appeal.

The Appellant submits that

there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction in this
matter and accordingly the trial court erred in failing to grant
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
In determining the issue on appeal, the standard of review
is well settled:
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences which
might be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict. A jury
conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted.
State v.
Salas,

Burk,

820 P.2d

839

P.2d

880, 884

1386, 1387

(Utah App.1992);

(Utah App.1991)

(quoting

State v.
State v.

Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)); accord State v. Jonas,
793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah App.), cert, denied 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah
1990); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App.1989).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISION
The controlling statutory provision is Utah Code Annotated
76-8-508 (1953 as Amended) which states as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation
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is pending or about to be instituted, he attempts to
induce or otherwise cause a person to:
(a) testify ot inform falsely;
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document,
item;
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide
evidence; or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or
investigation to which he has been summoned.
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he:
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for
anything done by another as a w i t n e s s or
informant;
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any
benefit in consideration of his doing any of the
acts specified under Subsection (1); or
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a
reasonable person would believe to be a threat to
do bodily injury to the person, because of any
act performed or to be performed by the person in
his capacity as a witness or informant in an
official proceeding or investigation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Danny L. Herring was charged of violating the
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 76-8-508 (1953 as Amended). A
jury trial was held on October 19, 1992 and a verdict of "guilty"
was

returned

on the

charge of witness tampering.

The

final

Judgment, Sentence and Commitment was entered by the Honorable
Ray M. Harding on November 30, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.
1.

General Background of the Witnesses.
The prosecution's

witness, Troy Lott was

twenty-six

years of age at the time of the trial of this matter (T.10, L.89 ) , and had known the Defendant Danny Herring for approximately
fourteen

to fifteen years

(T.5, L.14-18).

Troy had

actually

lived with the Defendant at the Defendant's home (T.10, L. 1217).
2.

The underlying proceeding giving rise to the charges in
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this case was a trial in which the Defendant, Danny Herring had
been

charged

with

assault

related

crimes

and

Troy

Lott

was

scheduled as a witness for the State of Utah (T.5, L.18-22).
B.

Facts Relating to Prior Conversations Concerning the
Defendantf s Upcoming Trial.

3.

Approximately thirty days prior to the date set for the

Defendant's

trial

on the

assault

charges, the

prosecution's

witness, Troy Lott, went to the Defendant's home (T.8, L.11-15).
At the Defendant's house on that occasion were the Defendant, Ty
Herring (the Defendant's brother), Chris Herring (the Defendant's
brother),

and

individuals

Jeff

Creviston

present

prosecution's

were

witness,

Troy

(Troy's

friends
Lott

nephew).
or

(T.46,

a

All

relative
L.3-19;

of

the

of

the

T.10

L.24

through 11, L.3; T.43, L. 11-19).
4.

Troy Lott, the prosecution's witness, gave conflicting

testimony

about

Defendant's home.
Q.

the

conversation

that

took

place

at

the

Initially Troy testified as follows:

You had a conversation with Danny over at his
house?
I don't recall no conversation about the trial.

A.
T.ll, L.4-7.

Troy then testified:
Q.
A.

You don't believe that you discussed the case at
all?
No, we didn't talk about the case very much. I kind
of knew not to. (Emphasis added)

T.ll, L.19-22.
Troy testified earlier that he did not think that there was any
conversation at the Defendant's home about the factual scenario
giving rise to the assault charges or Troy's expected testimony
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(T.8, L.11-15).
surmising

In that same tone Troy concluded the subject by

that he did not

think

the

assault was a topic of

discussion at the house (T.12, L.l-4).
5.

The

consistently.

Defendant

Danny

Herring

testified

clearly

and

The Defendant testified that he was surprised to

see Troy at his house after the incident wherein the

assault

allegedly took place because the Defendant "wasn't sure whether
we <Troy and Danny> were supposed to talk to each other." (T.26,
L.7-16).

The Defendant

then

testified

that

Troy

Lott

then

volunteered that he had been so drunk on the night the alleged
assault took place that he could not remember what took place
(T.26, L.17-20).
"if

it comes

Troy concluded the conversation by saying that

down to

it that if I have to go to court

and

testify, that I'm going to say that it was mostly me and Kevin
that was doing the fight and that you didn't really have nothing
to do with it." (T.26, L.21 through 27, L.l).
C.

Facts Relating to Troy Lott's Alleged "Shooting Spree."

6.

It is

not disputed that approximately six months before

their conversation at the Defendant's house, the Defendant and
Troy Lott had been at a party in Pleasant Grove, Utah.
party

Troy was once

again intoxicated.

At that

Troy relayed

to the

Defendant that he and some buddies while drinking and driving in
the hills had shot a man that caught them shooting coyotes and
buried his body in the lake (T.29, L.ll through 31, L.5; T. 17,
L. 20 through 18, L.2)

At trial, Troy said that the incident was

not real and had been made up (T.18, L.l,2).
D. Facts Surrounding the Charge of Witness Tampering.
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7.

As with his testimony relating to the conversation with

the Defendant
concerning

at the Defendant's house, Troy Lott's

the

actual

incident

wherein

alleged to have occurred varied.
that

one

day

Defendant

before

Danny

his

Herring

witness

testimony

tampering

is

Initially, Troy testified as

scheduled
called him

appearance

at

court,

and inquired whether

the
Troy

intended on appearing at the trial the next day and what Troy was
going to say (T.6, L.13-19).

Troy testified that he then told

the Defendant that he was going to tell the truth and testify the
same way as he did at the preliminary hearing (T.7, L.10-13).
8.

Troy then testified on direct examination as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Did he say anything else to you?
He asked me if I remembered him kicking me in
the face. That he didn't recall himself kicking me in the face.
Did you respond to that?
Yes, I Told him that I remembered that you did, and
I was going to say the same -- I was going to tell
the truth, the same thing I said in the
preliminary.
Did he say anything at that point?
He said it would really help him a lot if I didn't
testify to that.
Did he say anything else to you?
He brought up a time of we was having a party at a
friend's house in Pleasant Grove, and I guess I'd
told him about a shooting spree or something. He
brought that up and said if I was to testify tomorrow, I'd be better off if I didn't testify tomorrow or he would bring that up.
What did you say to him?
I told him I was still going to tel the truth and I
think that was about the end of the conversation.
(Emphasis added.)

T.7, L.13 through 8, L. 10.
9.

On cross-examination, Troy's testimony varied.

Troy

testified consistently that the Defendant first asked him if he
was going to testify and then inquired as to the subject matter
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of Troy's expected testimony (T. 13, L.8 through 14, L.19). Troy
conceded

that

the Defendant

then told him that he could

not

remember kicking Troy in the face and inquired whether Troy could
have hurt himself when he jumped in the back of the truck (T.15,
L.

13

through

16, L . 8 ) .

At

that

juncture,

the

Defendant

allegedly brought up the "shooting spree" that Troy was allegedly
involved in and troy responded, "well, we'll see you tomorrow,"
and hung up the phone (T.16, L.18-25).
10.

Troy Lott testified unequivocally that the Defendant

made no physical

threats of any kind

(T. 17, L. 4-9). As it

relates to the Defendant's alleged statement that he would bring
up

Troy's

alleged

shooting

spree, Troy testified

conclusively

that the story was made up by him and that there was no such
incident.

Accordingly,

Troy

testified

that

the

Defendant's

statement that he would bring up the incident did not worry him
(T. L.16 through 19, L.ll).
11.

The Defendant

testified

that

the phone

conversation

with Troy proceeded as follows:
Q.
A.

What, to the best of your recollection,
exactly what was aid by you and Troy?
Well, Troy answered the phone and I said, "hello,"
and he said, "hello."
I asked him how he was
doing. He said he was doing all right.
Then I asked him if he was going to have to show
up in court the next day and he said, "yeah, I've
been subpoenaed to show up in court." Then I
asked him, "wee, are you going to still tell
them what you told me at my house?" And he told
me that he didn't remember talking to me at my
house or even being there, as a matter of fact,
more or less.
Then I said, "well, don't you remember telling me
that you don't really remember what happened because you were so drunk and that I really didn't

6

Q.
A.

have nothing to do with the fight and it was mostly
you and Kevin?" And he told me that he didn't
remember saying that and that he's going to get up
there and tell them what he said in the preliminary
hearing.
What was the next thing that was said?
And then he said, "And I think you know that you
kicked me in the head twice and I think you ought
to think about that." Then I said "well, I think
you ought to think about the gun spree you told me
about," and then I hung up the phone.

T.28, L.l through 29, L.3.
12|

In explaining the conversation, the Defendant testified

that he thought Troy was being "smart" with him and he simply
reacted as if to say, "Hey, big deal. Think about this." (T.32,
L.6-19).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant respectfully submits that the evidence, taken
in the light most favorable to the prosecution does not justify a
finding of guilt and that the Court should reverse the decision
and grant the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, the
Defendant contends that the statements alleged to have been made
by him to the State's witness, Troy Lott, do not rise to a level
that

can, as a matter

of

law, warrant

a conviction

in this

matter.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
WARRANT THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
A review of the case law is instructive as to the type of
conduct

that

is deemed

sufficient

to warrant conviction. The

conduct must be such to imply culpability and exclude innocent or
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incidental

conversation.

The

Supreme

Court

dealt

with

the

relevant statute in State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512 (Utah 1981).
In that case the Defendant Terry Carlsen was convicted of witness
tampering.

Paul Hardy was to be the principal witness against

the defendant on a charge of disturbing the peace.

On the day

before trial on that charge the defendant Carlsen and his friend
Teeples ran into Hardy at a mall and Teeples testified that the
Defendant told him to tell Hardy that he had better not show up
at court the next day and that if he did he was going to be dead,
that they would kill him. Id. at 514.

The Court found that the

evidence was sufficient to warrant the conviction.
there

was

threatening
innocent

language

determined

as

and certainly not of a category of incidental

or

comment.

testified,

have

that

The

been

could

State's

clearly

witness

concerned

be

In that case,

clearly

could,

for his personal

as he

safety

and

justifiably reconsider whether he should testify. Id. at 14.
Contrasted with that situation are the facts in State v.
Rempel, 114 Wash.2d 77, 785 P.2d 1134 (1990).

The defendant Dale

Rempel and Diane DuBois had been friends for a number of years
and had been intimate on at least on occasion.

Prior to the

incident giving rise to the criminal charges, the defendant had
stayed at DuBois' apartment while she was out of town.
returned,
attempts

DuBois

testified

to have him move

attempted to rape her.
was arrested.
DuBois

that
out

the

defendant

and on the night

When she

resisted

her

in question

The defendant denied the allegations but

While in jail, the defendant attempted to call

a number of times but she only
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accepted

two or

three

collect calls.
the

The substance of those calls constitute all of

evidence of witness tampering

against the defendant.

In

those conversations the defendant related that he was sorry, that
it was going

to ruin his

life and asked DuBois to drop the

charges. Id. at 1135-36.
The

Washington

Supreme

Court

held,

after

viewing

the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, that the trier
of fact could not have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond

a

reasonable

doubt.

Id.

The

Court's

analysis

is

instructive:
The sum of the defendant's attempts are an apology, a
statement that "it" was going to ruin his life, and a request
that DuBois "drop the Charges."
The literal words contain no
express threat nor any promise of reward.
The words "drop the
charges" reflect a lay person's perception that the complaining
witness can cause a prosecution to be discontinued. . . However,
an attempt to induce a witness to withhold testimony does not
depend only upon the literal meaning of the words used.
The
State is entitled to rely on the inferential meaning of the words
and the context in which they were used. [Citing cases] Here the
State urges us to consider the underlying assaultive nature of
the crime. We do so, but we consider the entire context in which
the words were used, which also includes the prior relationship
between defendant and DuBois and her reaction to the phone calls.
The entire context negates any inference that the request to
"drop the charge" was in fact an inducement to withhold testimony
from a later trial.
DuBois testified that the calls did not
concern her, that she did not worry about them "other that the
fact that he was a real nuisance." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 1137.
The Court noted that it was not ruling that the language
used by the Defendant could never support a conviction but the
Court said:
. . .However, the witness' reaction here is relevant because
it tends to disprove the State's claim that the context of the
words spoken shows an attempt to induce DuBois to withhold
testimony.
Id. at 1137.
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Many of the cases dealt with by the Utah Appellate Courts
have involved cases of obvious threats and blatant conduct that
do not bear any resemblance to the facts of this case. See State
v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518 (Utah 1979); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d
874 (Utah 1985); and State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 442 (Utah Ct.App.
1989).
A closer case was presented to the Court in State v. Burk,
839 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). In that case the Defendant Burk
asked Ivan Phipps to accompany him to Jennifer Power's home to
help him burn her car.

Phipps was caught and charged.

Prior to

the time that the defendant Burk was charged, Burk talked

to

Phipps and told him to "[j]ust stick it out," while Burk tried to
"figure out ways to have good excuses or anything like that." Id.
at 882, 885.

Burk further asked Phipps to testify that he "

hadn't done it" and "knew nothing about it."

Additionally Burk

talked to Phipps about possible alibis. Id. at 882, 885.
In writing the majority opinion Judge Russon stated:
. . .That testimony demonstrates that Burk asked Phipps to
testify that Phipps had not committed the crime, and that he knew
nothing about it. By doing so, Burk not only attempted to induce
or otherwise cause Phipps to testify falsely, but also attempted
to induce or otherwise cause him to withhold critical testimony
about the crime.
Id. at 885.
In his opinion, dissenting in part, Judge Orme drew some
distinctions that are critical in the case at bar.
. .
Burk does
Phipps to
otherwise

.Phipp's testimony about his pretrial discussions with
not establish either that Burk "attempt[ed] to induce"
withhold testimony or that he " attempt [ed] to . . .
cause" Phipps to withhold testimony.

Careful review of Phipp's testimony indicates that Burk
wanted Phipps to stick it out while they figured out "good
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excuses or anything like that;" that the two
"possible alibis" concerning where Phipps and
been"; and that Burk wanted Phipps to testify
had not committed the crime and knew nothing of

merely discussed
Burk "could have
that he, Phipps,
the crime. . .

. . . The mere fact that one wants a particular thing, and
has made that desire known to another, does not necessarily mean
he has asked the other to bring it about.
The most that can be said of Burk's discussions with Phipps
is that Burk registered with Phipps a personal preference that
Phipps withhold testimony damaging to Burk.
This mere desire,
however, where not coupled with some tangible indicia of
inducement or causation, is not criminal. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 888-89.

Judge Orme noted that the statements were not

accompanied by threats, promises or extensive argument to evade
and

thus

did

not

constitute

sufficient

evidence

to

warrant

conviction. Id. at 889.
As it relates to the facts of this case, it is respectfully
submitted

that

the

rhetoric

used

by

the

Defendant

in

the

telephone conversation with Troy Lott was not culpable conduct
either when examined as a whole or dissected into its individual
components.
The first part of the conversation involved the discussion
by the Defendant and Troy Lott as to whether or not Troy was to
appear at court. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
all the Defendant did was to inquire whether or not Troy was
going to appear at trial the next day.
communication

that

would

even

hint

There is nothing in that
that

the

Defendant

was

attempting to overtly or by subtlety influence the witness to
"elude legal process" or
that was

scheduled

"absent himself

the next day

from the proceeding"

(T.6, L.15

through

7, L.2);

U.C.A. 76-8-508(l)(c) and (d) (1953 as Amended).
As

the

State's witness

testified,

11

the next

part of the

conversation involved the Defendantfs query as to the substance
of Troy Lott's expected testimony.
Defendant

As detailed by Mr. Lott, the

asked Troy what the substance of his testimony

going to be.

was

Troy responded that he was going to tell the truth

and that was what he had done when testifying at the Defendant's
preliminary hearing.

Again, when viewed only on the basis of the

State's evidence, there is absolutely nothing improper about the
Defendant's question.

Mr. Herring, by asking Troy the substance

of his expected testimony did nothing to try to alter or affect
Troy's testimony and thereby violate any of the specifics of the
witness

tampering

interviewing

statute.

a witness

or

There

is no prohibition

inquiring

against

into the knowledge of a

witness on relevant subject matter (T.7, L.7 through 12); U.C.A.
76-8-508(l)(a),(b)(1953 as Amended).
The third part of the conversation, according to the State's
evidence is the Defendant's comment, as described by Troy Lott,
that he could not remember kicking Troy in the face and inquiring
whether Troy could really recall that event.

Again, it is hard

to manufacture an argument that such interrogation is violative
of the relevant statute or even remotely improper (T.7, L.13-21);
U.C.A. 76-8-508(1)(a),(b)(1953 as Amended). In any interrogation
whether conducted by a police officer at a traffic accident, a
lawyer prior to or at trial or by mothers seeking to find the
truth

about

specifics

is

events
proper

in

their

and

children's

obviously

lives, delving

a permissible

determining the extent of a witness' memory.
Lott

had

testified

at

a preliminary

12

into

means

of

The fact that Troy

hearing

ought

not

be

considered
Lott's

somehow

dispositive

testimony.

of

the

issues

regarding

Troy

As the Court knows, there is no prepared

script to be read

at a preliminary

hearing.

Because of the

relatively light standard of proof at that proceeding, the State
may call only a portion of the witnesses that have knowledge
concerning the affair or ask only limited questions.

Many times

the lawyer for the defense and the Defendant hear for the first
time

the

knowledge

events.

of

Certainly,

various

witnesses

questioning

after

about

the

a preliminary

relevant
hearing

directed to aspects of the witness' testimony that may have been
missed or lightly covered at preliminary hearing is not violative
of

any

legal

or

ethical

guidelines.

As

indicated

in

the

testimony,the Defendant felt that Troy injured himself when, in
an intoxicated condition, he fell into the back of the truck.
Inquiring into that matter and asking Troy if he could really
remember the Defendant kicking him was proper and certainly not
criminal.
The fourth part of the conversation as related by Mr. Lott
is the Defendant's statement that it would really help him if
Troy

did not

Defendant

testify

(T.7, L.22

about being

kicked

in the head by the

to 24). Again the mere conveyance

to a

witness of what testimony is and is not in a person's interest is
not improper. As noted by Judge Orme on Burk, Supra.,
. . . The mere fact that one wants a particular thing,
and has made that desire known to another, does not necessarily
mean he has asked the other to bring it about.
Id. at 889.

Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the

Defendant simply told the witness, Troy Lott, that it would not
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be in his interest if he testified that the defendant kicked him
in

the

head.

That

statement

does

not

violate

any

of

the

provisions of the statute and when coupled with the Defendant's
explanation

is totally

innocent.

The Defendant, rightly

or

wrongly, was under the impression that Troy's testimony about the
incident in question was influenced by severe intoxication.

The

Defendant believed that Troy had admitted to him that he could
not really remember how he got hurt.

When confronted with Troy's

answers on the telephone that he was going to testify that the
Defendant kicked him, it was to be expected that the Defendant
would examine him further on the issue of the witness' memory and
try to establish for Troy, the issues affected by his testimony.
The statement was simply a device employed by the Defendant to
alert

the

witness

that

such

testimony

would

not

be

in Mr.

Herring's best interest and therefore he should really reflect on
his memory as to his recollection before so testifying.
The fifth and last part of the conversation relates to the
Defendant's

statement

to

Troy

that

if

Troy

testified

in

accordance with his stated intent, the Defendant would bring up
the so-called "shooting spree." (T.7, L.25 through 8, L. 6 ) . It
is respectfully submitted that it is at this juncture that the
Court must consider that the Defendant and the witness had known
each other for nearly fifteen years, had been good friends and
had even lived together in the Defendant's home.
the

Statement

of

Facts,

Troy

relates

this

As related in

segment

of

the

conversation as occurring at the end of the conversation, just
prior to both hanging up the phones.
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Troy testified that the

Defendant

made

the

statement

after he

failed

to give up any

ground on the issue of whether he was kicked by the Defendant or
injured as he fell into the back of the truck (T.7, L.25 through
8, L. 10). Troy testified on direct examination that after the
Defendant's statement that he would bring up the shooting spree
that he said that he was still going to tell the truth and hung
up.

On Cross-examination, he testified

that both

individuals

simply said "bye" and hung up the phones without further comment
(T.16, L. 18-25).
The Defendant testified that Troy was being "smart" with him
and told him, "And I think you know that you kicked me in the
head twice and I think you ought to think about that." (T.28, L.
22-25).
accusing

In essence, Troy was calling the Defendant
the Defendant of mis-stating

events of the alleged assault.
the comment,

a liar,

his real memory of the

In response, the Defendant made

"well, I think you ought to think about the gun

spree you told me about." (T.28, L.25 through 26, L.3).
If

the

Court

reviews

the

comment

in

light

of

the

familiarity of the parties, it is respectfully submitted that the
statement was harmless and incidental.

An off the cuff remark

that was not pursued by either party after it was said should not
be taken

as culpable. Neither

Troy or the Defendant

enough about it to comment any further.
their

testimonies, both

comment is viewed

thought

According to both of

simply hung up the phone.

in the light of their relationship

When the
and the

Defendant's perception of the witness' rudeness, it is unfair to
hang a witness tampering charge on that one phrase.
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As the Court

did in Rempel, Supra,, when the conversation is viewed in light
of the on-going relationship of the parties, the statements lose
any real portrayal of evil intent or deed.
Lastly, to be considered a threat, the statement must be
capable of being
involved.

reasonably

construed

as such by the

parties

The witness, Troy Lott, testified that the story, if

he did tell the Defendant, was made up and had no truth in fact.
Accordingly, Troy was not worried about the statement made by the
Defendant

(T.19,

L.6-7).

The

Defendant

had

reported

the

incident to his lawyer long before the conversation and knew the
same to be untrue (T.31, L.12 through 33, L. 13). Even in the
light most favorable to the State, the comment of the Defendant
can hardly be construed as a threat by either the Defendant or
witness.
CONCLUSION
It

is

sufficient

respectfully
to

justify

submitted
or

sustain

that
a

the

evidence

conviction

of

is not
witness

tampering and that this Court in analyzing the background of the
parties, the substance of the conversation of the parties on one
occasion and the legal standard established in reviewing these
matters, should reverse the conviction.
DATED this ^A

day of July, 1993

^

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that

o

copies of the Appellant's Brief were
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mailed, postage prepaid to Ms. Jan Graham, Attorney General at
the address set out on the face of this pleading on the

«^

day of July, 1993.
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Steven B. Killpack, #1808
Public Defender's Office
Attorney for Appellant
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone (801) 379-2570
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL
REGARDING ADDENDUM TO
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

DANNY L. HERRING,

Case No. 930006-CA

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Criminal No. 921400274
Defendant and Appellant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Steven B. Killpack, after first being duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

I am counsel for the Appellant in the above referenced

matter.

I did not represent the Appellant at trial but represent

his interests on appeal.
2.

I have read the Record and the Transcript in this matter

and prepared the Appellant's Brief.
Notice

was

being

issued

irregularities in the brief.

by

I was advised orally that a

this

Court

with

regard

to

Specifically, I was advised that

the priority number was not attached, which the Clerk of the

Court has indicated will be written on the Brief.

Secondly, that

the position of the designation of the attorneys on the cover
page

is

juxtaposed

deficiency.

and

Lastly,

the

I was

Clerk

has

advised

agreed

that

to waive

an Addendum

that

to

the

Appellant's Brief was due on Friday, August, 27, 1993.
3.

I have again gone over the case and the brief carefully.

I specifically reviewed Rule 24 and in particular, Rule 24(f) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

There are no "opinions,

memorandum of decision, finding of fact, conclusions of law, or
order pertaining to the issues on appeal" or any other part of
the

record

Appellant's

that

in

Brief.

my
All

opinion

requires

references

believed to be complete and fair.

to

attachment
the

to

the

Transcript

are

All decisions are adequately

detailed and set forth in the Brief.
4. Unless

the

Court wishes

the

case

law

cited

and

the

portions of the transcript quoted to be attached in the Addendum
as part

of

it's policy,

I believe

proper and conforms to the Rules.

the Appellant's

brief

is

Further, I do not believe that

the Appellant's position would be enhanced by the compilation of
an Addendum.
5.

Of

course,

if

the

Court

desires

portions

of

the

transcript or case law attached, pursuant to it's preference in
these matters, I will of course comply.
DATED this ^ f T " day of August, 1993.
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State of Utah,

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 930006-CA

v.
Danny Herring,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion
for leave to file a late brief, filed July 26, 1993.

Appellee

stipulated to the motion.
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant is
granted leave to file a late brief.

The brief filed by

appellant on 26 July 1993, however does not contain an addendum
pursuant to Rule 24(f), Utah R. App. P.

Appellant shall have

until 27 August 1993 to file the required addendum or inform
the Court that no addendum is required.

Appellee shall

thereafter have until 27 September to file appellee's brief.
Dated this

of August, 1993.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of August, 1993, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail to the party listed below:
Steven B. Killpack
Utah County Public Defender Association
40 South 100 West, Suite 200
Provo, UT 84601
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney
General's Office to be delivered to the parties listed below:
Jan Graham
State Attorney General
Kris C. Leonard
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Dated this 20th day of August, 1993.

